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Intmduction 
In the German-speaking worid, Hans Blumenberg (1920-1996) is generally con-
sidered to have been one of the most brilHant, universally learned and prolific 
Interpreters of Western intellectual history. Several o f his many books have been 
translated into a variety of languages, seven of them into Eng l i sh . ' His philo-
sophical thinking may be portrayed as a large-scale criticism of the Piatonic-
Chr isdan heritage, very much in the tradition of Nietzsche and Freud.^ Not sur-
prisingly then, the philosophy and theology of the Latin middle ages have an 
important part to play in Blumenberg's criticism of religion and metaphysics. 
This is true in particular of some mainstream theological doctrines of the 
later Middle Ages. Blumenberg comments upon them in a whole series of books 
and articles. The philosophical theology of the early Lat in Middle Ages, by con-
1 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, MA: M IT Press, 
1999) [orig.; Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1966)]; Work on Myth 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) [ox\g.: Arbed am Mythos (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1979)]; The Genesis of the Copermcan World (Cambridge, MA: M I T Press, zooo) [orig.: 
Die Genesis der kopemikanischen Welt, 3 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981)]; Shipwreck 
with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphorfor Existence (Cambridge, MA: M IT Press, 1997) 
[orig.: Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer: Paradigma einer Daseinsmetapher (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1979)]; Die Sorge geht über den Fluss (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003) [orig.: Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, i^Sj)]; Matthäuspassion (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2003) [orig.: Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988)]; and Paradigms for a 
Metaphorology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010) [orig.: Paradigmen zu einer 
Metaphorologie (Bonn: Bouvier, i960)]. A l l translations are, however, my own. 
2 See my "Nach der Apokalypse der Vernunft: Hans Blumenbergs Kr i t ik der Apoka-
lyptik im Rahmen seines philosophischen Programms," in Kritik der postmodernen 
Vernunft: Über Derrida, Foucault und andere zeitgenössische Denker, ed. Bernd Goebel 
and Fernando Suarez Müller (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007), 
177-202. 
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trast, is much less iengthily dealt w i th . Sti l l , Blumenberg is far from simpiy pass-
ing over i t . Origen and Augustine figure more than once in his writ ings. And so 
does Saint Anselm ( 1 0 3 3 - 1 1 0 9 ) , whom he takes to be "next to Origen the grea-
test thinker in the first mi l lenn ium of the Christian tradition."^ His scattered 
and usually very dismissive remarks on Anselm continue to shape the Anselm 
Image o f many o f his readers. Whi le Blumenberg's Interpretation o f later 
rnedieva! theology focussing on the concept o f God in nominal ism has been 
under fire since i t was brought forward in the i 9 6 o s , 4 his Interpretation o f 
early medieval theology focussing on Anselm has not often, it ever, been put to 
the test. 
Blumenberg chiefly comments on Anselm in three o f his hooks, Arbeit am 
Mythos ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Matthäuspassion ( 1 9 8 8 ) and the posthumously arranged Beschrei-
bung des Menschen ( 2 0 0 6 ) , 5 as v/ell as in an earlier entry on "Transzendenz und 
Immanenz" in. the dictionary Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart { 1 9 6 2 ) . ^ 
His Anselm Interpretation does not seem to have evolved over this whole period. 
He is mainly concerned w i th three points Anselm makes: (a) the concept o f God 
and the so-calied ontological argument in Anseim's i^rai/og/o« (in particular w i th 
a supposed conflict between the concept o f God as id quo maius cogitari nequit 
in Proslogion 2 , and the concept o f God as quiddam maius quam cogitaripossit, in 
Proslogion 15 ) ; and two issues that, according to h i rn, betray the "mythological" 
character o f Anseim's theology - (b) Anseim's theory of salvation, and (c) a piece 
of theological anthropology in the Cur Deus hom.o, nameiy his discussion o f 
3 Blumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 298 . We need to understand "mi l lenn ium" as a rough 
approximation to make sense of this, though. 
4 See, for example, Wolfgang Hübener, "Die Nominalismus-Legende: Über das 
Missverhäknis zwischen Dichtung und Wahrheit i n der Deutung der Wirkungs-
geschichte des Ockhamismus," in Spiegel und Gleichnis: Festschriftfür Jacob Taubes, ed. 
Norbert Bolz and Wolfgang Hübener (Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 
1983) , 87 -111 ; Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die christliche Legitimität der Neuzeit: 
Gedanken zu einem Buch von Hans Blumenberg," in his Gottesgedanke und men-
schliche Freiheit, Sammlung Vandenkoeck (Görtingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 
1978) , 114-128. 
5 Blumenberg, Beschreibimg des Menschen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2 0 0 6 ) . 
6 Blumenberg, "Transzendenz und Immanenz," in Dte Religion in Geschichte und Ge-
genwart, ed Friedrich Michael Schiele, Hermann Gunkel, Otto Scheel and Leopold 
Zscharnack,7 vols. (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr, 1957-1965) , 6: 989-997.There is another, 
less important reference to Anselm in an early study, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorolo-
gie, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6 (Bonn: Bouvier, i 9 6 0 ) : Blumenberg relates 
Anseim's account of how he came to discover the Ontological Argument wich the 
metaphor of "the mighty trurh," although Anselm never uses the terms "true" er 
" t ru th " in this account. 
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Augustine's clairn that some humans make up for the fallen angels and restitute 
the perfect number of rational creatures who contemplate God. For this th i rd 
point, Blumenberg takes Anselm to be hold ing that humans would not have 
been part o f creation ar all i f all the angels had kept their integrity: that human-
ity, in other terms, is a mere ersatz. 
The fol lowing is an assessment o f two o f the three pieces o f criticism. which 
Blumenberg levels against Anselm. In the first part, I w i l l have a look at Blu-
menberg’s objections to Anseim’s ontological argument (or arguments). In the 
second part, I w i l l turn to his interpretadon o f Anseim's theological anthropol-
ogy and examine ßlumenberg’s clairn that humanity, for Anselm, owes its very 
existence to the fall o f the angels. 1 w i l l not be able to discuss Blumenberg ’s 
objections to Anseim's theory of salvadon. In the last part I w i l l touch upon Blu-
menberg’s further claim that Anseim’s Cur Deus homo is an exam.ple o f early me›
dieval mythology rather than of philosophical theology. Al though I w i l l not be 
able to go into Blumenberg's theory o f mythology, I w i l l argue that we should 
reject this pecuüar Suggestion altogether. 
But am I doing justice to Blumenberg when I take h i m to be a critic o f Saint 
Anselm? Is he really concerned w i th the value of Anseim’s rational theology.' Is 
he not better understood as a detached spectator o f the theatre o f human 
thought whose only aspiration is "to observe, to listen, and to recount".'^ j h e 
answer to this query is that Blumenberg is indeed a critic o f Anselm in the strict 
sense o f the word. In view o f his epic works on the histoiy o f ideas, his method 
has sometimes been misread as purely descriptive. Blumenberg's (jeuvre does not 
merely consist o f studies in the history o f ideas; but even i n these studies, he 
incessantly judges and values, criticizes and commends. We have already come 
across his assessment o f Origen as a "greater" thinker than was Anselm, and the 
assessment of both as "greater" than all other figures i n the first m i l lenn ium of 
the history o f Christian theology (such as Augusnne). His many - and only occa-
sionally indignant judgements concerning Anselm make i t piain that Blu-
menberg is entertainingaphilosophical discmsion guided by rational argument. 
1 his remains true even i f his procedure may be described as monologic rather 
than dialogic.^ ßlumenberg’s objections often come down to convicdng Anselm 
7 Ingrid Breuer, Peter Leu.sch and Dieter Mersch,"Von Geschichte zu Geschichten: Zu 
Hans Blumenbergs Metaphorologie," in their Wehen im Kopf: Profile der Gegenwart-
sphdoiophie, vol. v. Deutschland (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1996) , 68 : "Weder urteilt noch bew-
ertet er: er schaut lediglich hin, hört zu, erzählt nach." 
8 See, for example, Blumenberg, Arbeü am Mythos, Z78: "Es ist beinahe unfassbar, dass 
ein Mann wie Anselm " 
9 Goebel, "Nach der Apokalypse," 2.00-202. 
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of some logica! iriconsistency or other. As early as in his dictionary entry men~ 
tioned above, Biumenberg engages - i f only t im id ly - in immediate philosoph-
ical argument, rather than merely reporting the arguments o l others. 
I . Blumenberg's Critique of Anseim's Ontological Argument 
i . i The Ontological Argument as a Proof o f the Existence of God 
Anselm is best known for his argument wh ich Kant called the "ontological 
proof!' Modern theology, especially in the wake o f Karl Barth's Anselm inter-
pretation, has often come to doubt its being a proof o f the existence o f God at 
ail. '° Again, i t is controversial whether the reasoning in Proslogion 2 and the rea-
soning in Proslogion 3 make up one single argument or two numerically differ-
ent arguments. Contemporary philosophers of rel igion mostly agree i n distin-
guishing at least two basic forms of the ontological argument (henceforth: the 
OA), one of which makes use of modal logic while the other does not. (One may, 
of course, continue to speak of "the" OA as a generic term.) In Proslogion 2 , An-
selm develops a version o f the non-modal OA; but he also puts forward the first 
Version of the modal argument, i f not already in Proslogion 3 , so at least in his 
response to his critic who writes "on behalf o f the fool."The former aims at estab-
lishing the logicai necessity of God's real, rather than merely possible or imagi-
nary, existence; the latter aims at establishing the logicai necessity o f God's nec~ 
essary existence." 
Blumenberg does not differentiate the modal from the non-modal OA, He 
seems to suppose that Anselm has propounded just one single (non-modal) OA. 
Thus, Blum.enberg invariably talks of "the" OA in Anselm, o f "Anseim's onto-
logical prooP'While this was all but common usage at the t ime he was wr i t ing , 
it is none the less unfortunate. For the purpose o f this essay I w i l l , however, fol-
low h im here and refer to the non-modal OA in Proslogion 2 as "Anseim's OA" (or 
"proof^' meaning "proof o f God's real existence'), as i f this were all there is to i t 
I o See Kar! Barth, Fides quaerens inteilectum; Anselm 's Proof of the Existence of God in the 
Contextofhis TheologicalScheme (London: SCM Press, i 9 6 0 ) . 
I I See Brian Leftow, "The Ontological Argument," in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Religion, ed. Wi l l iam Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Z005 ) , 80 -116 ; 
Bernd Goebel, "Nachdenken i^ ibcr den ontologischen Gottesbeweis: Eine Diskus-
sion philosophischer Einwände gegen seine beiden Grundformen mit einem Blick 
auf die 7AxgQnö^skchtlhco\ogK^ Neue Zeitschriftfiir Systetnatische Theologie undReli-
gtonsphilosophie 51 (2009 ) : 105-144; Goebel,"Anseim's Elusive Argument: lan Logan 
Reading the Proslogion" The Saint Anselm Journal 7 ( 2 0 0 9 ) : 7 5 - 9 6 , %s-
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in Anselm. As a matter o f fact, l^lumenberg takes i t for granted that Anseim's 
intendon really ivas to prove the real existence o f God. This at least seems to be 
not only the most obvious but also the most reasonable reading oiProslogion 2 -
4, although the aspiration of the Proslogion as a whole is to establish the identiry 
o f the Christian God w i th the most perfect being (which one might dub the 
"•philosophers'God").'^ It is, however, ill-defined to characterize the ontological 
proof w i th Blumenberg as an argument "that rests upon the definit ion o f a per-
fect being as that than which a greater cannot be thought.'"^ Rather, the proof 
rests upon the definit ion o/Godas, that (or something) than which a greater can-
not be thought - which amounts to saying that i t rests upon the defini t ion o f God 
as a most perfect being. 
Blumenberg also takes i f for granted that " the" OA, i n Anselm and else-
where, is doomed to fail. He does not doubt that i t has been successfully 
refuted;"4 he calls Anselm the "inventor o f this God from the concept"'^ and 
regards the ontological proof as a figment born from an "overestimation of the 
conceptual,"'^' as an "escaiation of the concept o f God into the epitome o f his de-
monstrable existence'''^ Who has, in Blumenberg's estimation, successfully 
refuted Anseim's OA.' In the German speaking-world, the philosopher most 
often credited w i t h this accomplishment is Kant; and Blumenberg indeed holds 
Kant to have "unhinged this whole complex" by showing that being is no "real 
predicate."'^ I w i l l rcvisit these objections in a moment. For the t ime being, let 
me only remark that, paradoxically, Blumenberg advanced his refutation clairn 
at a moment in the history o f the philosophy of religion when the ontological 
proof was experiencing its most spectacular renaissance since the seventeenth 
Century.'^ Fifty years ago, Dieter Henrich observed that the OA"is being rejected 
i z Ibid., %6. "A most perfect being" is a being that is perfect in every respect. I take this 
expression to be equivalenr to Anseim's term aliquid quo maius cogitari nequit. Anselm 
apparently thinks rhar there can only be one such being and exchanges this indefi-
nite description w i th rhe definite description id quo maius cogitari nequit (my "the 
most perfect being") wirhout further ado. I w i l l not discuss whether this move is jus-
tified and simpiy foUow Anselm here. 
13 Biumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, 235. 
14 Biumenberg, Arbeü am Mythos, "erfolgreichen Widerlegung"; and Matthäuspas-
sion, 298 : "Widerlegungen." 
15 Biumenberg, Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit, 379 . 
16 Blumebberg, Arbeit am Mythos, 279 . 
17 Biumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 298 . 
{ 8 Biumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, 646. 
19 ' i he manuscripts edited as Beschreibung des Menschen mostly date back to the 1970s; 
see the editor's epilogue in Beschreibung des Menschen, 904--9 r i . 
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wi th a rare unanimity, or is not even taken seriousiy."-^° This has ceased to be true 
for almost forty-five years now. 
1.2 Two Incompatible "Der in i t ions"of God 
Blumenberg's principal worry regarding Anseim's OA, however, is not drawn 
from Kant. For Blumenberg, the OA in the Proslogion founders on the incom-
patibil ity between the concept o f God as the most perfect being i n Proslogion 2 
and the concept of God as "something greater than can be thought" in Proslogion 
15, In Proslogion 15, Anselm writes: "Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than 
which a greater cannot be thought, but You are something greater than can be 
thought."" 
Blumenberg takes these to be " two defmidons"^^ o f God. O n other occa-
sions he speaks o f two "concepts o f God, a rat ional. . . and a transcendent one,"^^ 
The former Blumenberg also calls the "God o f the philosophers," the latter con-
cept the "God o f faith"^^ and Anseim's tribute to rhe tradidon of negative the-
ology.^5 Now these two concepts, in his eyes, simpiy cannot be reconciled.They 
exclude each other and, consequently, define two different things: "The neces-
sarily exisdng being, a greater than which cannot be thought, is not yet God, i f 
God must be greater than anything that can be thought."^^ From this, Blumen-
berg concludes that, by introducing the concept o f God as quiddam maius quam 
cogitari possit, Ansdm''de$tToys''^'^ and impl ic i t ly "revokes"^^ his OA. In Proslogion 
15, Anselm, ironically, furnishes nothing less than a "proof" that his own defi-
n i t ion o f God as a most perfect being is quite inept for the purposes o f a proof 
o f God's existence, and hence furnishes nothing short of a disproof o f the OA.^^ 
But this seems too rash. Given Anseim's presupposition that something is 
more perfect i f i t transcends our th ink ing than i f i t does not, the concept o f God 
as something greater than can be thought, clearly, is implied by the concept o f a 
20 Dieter Flenrich, Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, znd cd. (Tübingen: Mohr, [ 9 6 7 ) , v 
21 Anselm,Proi/og/o«, 11:2. 
22 ?AvLm(tnhtr^, Matthäuspassion, 101. 
23 Blumenberg, "Transzendenz und Immanenz," 9 9 2 f 
24 Blumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, 379 . 
25 Biumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 299 . 
26 Blumenberg, Beschreibimg des Menschen, 379 , n. i . C f Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, 993 : "Das bedeutet: der Gott, der bewiesen werden konnte, ist noch nicht 
der Gort, an den sich der gläubige Sinn hier in betender Anrede wendet." 
27 C f Blumenberg, Matthäuspasswn, 2 9 8 f 
28 B!umenberg, Beschreibimg des Menschen, 379 . 
29 C f Blumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 298 . 
most perfect being {id quo maius cogitari nequit, henceforth IQM) ; and Blumen-
berg does not question this presupposition of Anseim's but seems to share i t . 
The reason why God, for Anselm, is "something greater than can be thought" is, 
precisely, his being I Q M - as is piain from Proslogion 15 where he deduces the 
property o f being "greater than can be thought" from the concept o f God as a 
most perfect being by way o f a reductio argument. In order to demonstrate Blu-
menberg's claim that the second concept of God is at odds w i th the first one, one 
would need to attack Anseim's premise according to which i t is a perfection to 
be greater than can be thought; or to show that the first concept, the concept o f 
God as a most perfect being ( IQM) is incoherent (or do both). For i f we can con-
clusively deduce concept B from concept A under premise c, although A and B 
exclude each other, then either premise c is false, or the confl ict must have 
already been hidden in A (or, again, both). Blumenberg does neither; and the rea-
son why he falls to do so is most probably his disregard of rhe derivative nature 
of the second concept. He erroneously takes i t to be a second definition o f God; 
two definitions may of course conflict w i th each other wi thout further ado. The 
truth is, however, that Anselm only proposes one definit ion o f God in the Proslo-
gion, by means of the famous description I Q M , whereby God is defined as the 
most perfect being. Srrictly speaking,"God is I Q M " is a mere descripdon, not a 
definit ion, because a definit ion in the traditional Aristotelian-Boethian sense is 
always generic and, arguablyGod does not belong to any genus.3° I t may sdll be 
regarded as a definit ion in a loose and populär sense. From this unique concept 
of God he then deduces God's real and necessaiy existence as well as a couple 
of other predicates - thus the property of being greater than can be thought. 
The quesDon remains: Is there really a conflict between the concept of I Q M 
and the concept o f "something greater than can be thought".' This is certainly 
debatable.-^' The first th ing to note here is that there is no obvious confl ict 
between the concept o f I Q M and the concept o f "something greater than can be 
thought." Why should "something a greater than which cannot be thought" not 
be "greater than can be thought’? Surely, the meaning of I Q M alone does not 
rule this out. On the other hand, i f I Q M is to be a concept at al l , the expression 
I Q M , by which i t is signified, must be understandable. And in that respect at 
least, the concept signified by this expression must be capable of being thought. 
Understanding something, according to Anselm, implies th ink ing i t (though 
not vice versa, as Proslogion 4 shows). In its first Step, the ontological proof in 
30 C f lan Logan, Reading Anseim's Proslogion: The History of Anseim's Argument and its 
Significance Today (Farnham: Ashgate, 2 0 0 9 ) , 187. 
3 f For the remainder of this chapter, see my "Anseim's Elusive Argument," §7 . 
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Proslogion z explicitly presupposes that the defini t ion o f God as I Q M can be un-
derstood - and that in that respect, the most perfect being can indeed be 
thought. 
The author o f the Pro insipiente seems to have been the first to deny that 
the most perfect being is such that i t can be thought and understood at all. For, 
says Gaunilo (or whoever he was), the most perfect being is certainly very dif-
ferent from anything we know, so that we cannot even make conjectures (con-
icere) as to what it is like.3^ This he regards as a fatal objection against Anseim's 
ontological argument. According to Gauni lo, God is not capable o f being 
thought in the way Anseim's ontological arguments require God to be thinkable. 
Againsr Gaunilo, Anselm insists that conjectures concerning the nature of God 
can indeed be made: thus, a higher good known to us w i l l be more similar to 
the most perfect being than a lower good.^^ To reiiite the claim that the most 
perfect being must be inconceivable and hence unthinkable, Anselm proposes 
the fol lowing distinction: 
But even i f i t were true that [ I Q M ] cannot be thought nor understood, it 
would not, however, be false that [ IQM] cannot be thought and understood. 
For just as... one can th ink "unthinkable," although that to which i t corre-
sponds to be called unthinkable cannot be thought, so also, when i t is said: 
[ I Q M ] , there is no doubt at all that what is heard can be thought and under-
stood, even i f the thing "than which a greater cannot be thought" cannot be 
thought or understood.34 
According to Anselm, then, there is a difference between " th ink ing the con-
cept" o f a th ing and " th ink ing the th ing" conceived o f "itself!' However, Anselm 
does not say much more about the nature o f this difference. We can, perhaps, un-
derstand his dist inct ion in the fol lowing manner: " to th ink the concept" o f a 
th ing means to understand its def ini t ion (or a descripdon o f i t that captures 
something essendal); " to th ink the th ing itself" means to understand its defini-
t ion and to seize all its essential properties. 
Does this make sense? I t seems that i t does. Consider, first, the well-known 
def ini t ion o f a "person" by Boethius. To understand this expression is not only 
to " th ink the concept" o f a person, but also " to th ink " and to understand - sup • 
32 C f Anselm, Pro imipiente 4 .126-127. 
33 C f Anselm, Kesponsio editoris 8 .137-138. 
34 Ibid. , 9.138. 
Hans Blumenberg's Anselm 30/ 
posing the def in i t ion is true - "the th ing itsel.f'This is because the def in i t ion 
contains all the essential properties o f a person: its individuality, substantiality 
and rationality. Now consider the expression "the entire set o f Anseim's wr i t -
ings." Whoever understands this expression, " th inks the concept" o f this set, 
but normally does not " th ink the th ing i t s e l f even i f he migh t do so w i t h the 
help o f a complete list o f Anseim's wri t ings. Finally, consider the expression 
"the set o f all pr ime numbers" (a set being such that all its Clements are essen-
tial to i t ) . To understand this expression, for us, is " to th ink the concept" o f this 
inf ini te set. But i t is never " to th ink the th ing itself^' because a f ini te m i n d is 
incapable o f th ink ing i t thus. And the same holds true o f God as I Q M : one 
can understand the formula " that than wh ich a greater cannot be thought " 
and therefore th ink God according to his concept, as is presupposed by the 
ontological proof. However, God cannot be " thought himself"; God is greater 
than can be thought. 
I can th ink o f at least two possible reasons why this is so. ( i ) The ontologi-
cal argument takes as its starting poinr the description of God as a most perfect 
being ( IQM). By this description, we can grasp something essential o f God, and 
of God alone. To this extent, God can be conceived o f and thought by us. But i t 
does not allow us to grasp the entire essence of God. The whole essence of God 
cannot be grasped by any description. God, that is, cannot be defined. And in 
that respect, God is inconceivable and unthinkable. I f we know that there is (one 
Single) most perfect being, then v/e know that God exists. But we do not fathom 
entirely what it means that God exists i f we know that a most perfect being 
exists, ( 2 ) Here is another way c f reconciling the conclusion Proslogion 15 (that 
God is "greater than can be thought") w i th the ontological proof: the description 
of God as a most perfect being is a complete essendal definidon of God, albeit 
not a generic one. God is not essentially a most perfect being and something eise. 
In that respect, God can be thought. Yet we cannot whol ly understand God's 
essence, because there are perfections o f which we may now not have a not ion, 
or because there are infinitely many perfections so that we cannot form a con-
cept o f them all. We cannot hence grasp all o f God's essential properties. And in 
that respect, God is inconceivable and unthinkable. Again, I f we know that there 
is (one single) most perfect being, we know that God exists. But we do not 
fathom entirely what i t means that God exists i f we know that a most perfect 
being exists. 
There may be other reasons why God as I Q M is "greater than can be 
thought" that do not affect the meaningfulness o f the proposi t ion "God is 
IQM." But these two ~ and especially the second, I should say - are rather prom-
ising candidates. IJke others (John Marenbon and Jules Vu i l l emin , for instan-
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ce),35 Blumenberg has faiied to distinguish the property referred to by Anselm 
when calüng God something "greater than can be thought" from the property 
of being altogether tmthinkable. Unlike the latter no t ion , the former does not 
exclude God's being able to be thought in the weak sense of God's being 
thinkable according to his concept. And this alone seems to be the sense 
required by the ontological argument. I conclude that the confl ict, evoked by 
Blumenberg, between the God o f the philosopher and the God o f faith does 
not really obtain i n Anselm. 
1,3 Other Objections Against Ansehn's Ontological Argument 
Blumenberg adopts three more objections against Anseim's OA. 
(a) The first is the one put forward by Kant to the effect that existence is 
no "rea! predicare''^'' This is the semantic version o f an ontological objection 
raised already by Gassendi against Descartes' ontological argument and wh ich 
States that existence is no property In his proof i n Proslogion 2, Anselm com-
pares the concept o f a being that contains all perfections except for real exis-
tence w i th that o f a being that contains all perfecdons inc iuding real existence. 
Blumenberg sounds very much like Kant in his cri t ique o f Descartes' onto-
logical argument when he interprets the Anselmian proof thus: "Existence is 
something i n addi t ion to essence, som.ething that distinguishes i t f rom the 
merely possible. In short: being is a real predicate."^^ Yet i t seems that existence 
is not a property l ike most other properties. According to Kant, no th ing is 
added to the concept o f something possible, i f we suppose that i t is also real. 
A blue elephant in my imaginadon does not differ i n conceptual content f rom 
a blue elephant wh ich really exists and which exactiy corresponds to how I 
have been imagin ing l t . Anseim's comparison does not seem to get of f the 
ground. 
3 5 See John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction 
(London; New York: Routiedge, 2 0 0 7 ) , 128: " I f being able to be thought - conceiv-
ability - is made equivalent to possibility, then God, being greater than can be 
thought and so not able to be thought, is impossible"; Jules Vuillemin, Le Dien 
dAnselme et les apparences de la raison (Paris: Aubier, 1971) , 5 8 - 7 2 , esp. 70 , 
36 Cf Immanuel Kant, Kants Werke, Academie Textausgabe vol. 3: Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968) , B626 . 
37 Cf Pierre Gassendi, Objectiones Qtiintae adversus Descartes Meditationes, in Descartes, 
CEuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Edidon du Jubile (Paris: 
Vrin, 1996) , 7: 323. For a süghtly more thorough discussion of this objecdon, see 
Bernd Goebel, "Nachdenken über den ontologischen Gottesbeweis," 125-128. 
38 Blumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, 646. 
But, as recent discussion has shown, Ansehn's OA does not presuppose at all 
that existence is a property Hke most others. For Anseim's claim that a being 
wi th all perfections inciuding real existence, is more perfect than a being w i th 
all perfections except for real existence, only implies that for this being, real exis-
tence is a perfection. It does not imply that existence is a property like most 
other properties (that i t is a "first-order property") such as omnipotence and 
eterniry^'^ Existence could be a unique kind o f predicate and still be a perfection. 
Imagine a chi ld who truthful ly says,"My older brother cannot do tricks like 
Harry Potter," and then adds, "But at least my older brother really exists." Then 
we do not only know that the older brother is no great magician, but we also 
know that he is not merely a figment o f this child's Imagination.4° This view is 
at odds w i t h the so-ca!led quantifier analysis o f existence. But the quantifier 
analysis is inapt to explain, let alone to define the not ion o f existence, because -
quite apart from its many other problems^' - an explanation or def ini t ion o f 
existence in terms o f the existendal quantifier would inevitably be circular.4--
(b) The second objection concerns the coherence of Anseim's concept o f 
God. Is a most perfect being really Iogically possible? To Blumenberg's under-
standing, this Problem has first been posed "centuries later"43 by John Duns Sco~ 
tus. It is true that the logicai possibility o f a most perfect being is only being 
presupposed by Anselm. Leibniz, Gödel and others have thereupon attempted 
to bridge this gap.44 One remark by Blumenberg is apparently designed to sug-
gest that Scotus, at least, d id not succeed in demonstrating the coherence o f a 
most perfect being: "The possible is only possible through the subject God.... Yet 
against Anselm, Scotus was the first to argue that his argument for existence 
from the concept would only be conclusive i f the possibility, i f the logicai con-
39 See Alvin Plantinga's remark (The Nature of Necessity,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, 
repr. 2 0 0 6 ) , 196: "Kant never specified a sense of ' is a predicate' such that, in that 
sense, it is clear both that existence is not a predicate and that St Anseim's argument 
requircs it to be one." See also Brian Davies: "Anselm and the Ontological Argument," 
in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow (C]am-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 4 ) , 160 ,170 . 
40 C f Brian Leftow,"The Ontological Argument," i 0 7 f 
41 See Goebel, "Nachdenken über den ontologischen Gottesbev>'eis," 125-127. 
42 C f F.Jonathan Lowe," The Ontological Argument," in The Roudedge Companion to 
Philosophy of Religion,cd.CMdid Meister and Paul Copan (London: Routiedge, 2 0 0 7 ) , 
307: "Far from serving to explain the notion of existence, this notion needs to be 
explained by appeai to that very notion. ...The Frege-Rirsscll objection and the Kant-
ian objection from which i t descends is just a red herring w i th no real bearing on ehe 
soundness of the ontological argument." 
43 Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, 2 9 8 . 
44 See Goebel,"Nachdenken über den ontologischen Gottesbeweis," 1:38-143. 
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siscency of the elements fixecl in the concept can be ascertained."45 What Biu-
menberg, apparently, is suggesting here is that any vindication of God's logicai 
possibility for the purposes o f Anseim's argurnent is doomed to be circular, since 
the OA for God's existence presupposes the logicai possibility o f a most perfect 
being, whi le ontologically speaking, the logicai possibil ity o f a most perfect 
being presupposes the existence of God. 
But even i f this were true, i t would not necessariiy render the OA for God's 
existence impossible; i t only would i f the logicai possibility o f a most perfect 
being could not be proved or justified independently o f the assumption that i t 
originäres in the m ind o f God. What is more, Scotus's doctrine of possible enti-
des only concerns the possible existence (and the eidedc content) o f creatures. 
(t does not apply to God himself 4^ Thirdly, the question o f how Scotus con-
ceives of the relationship between thesepossibih'a and the divine intellect is very 
much a matter o f scholarly debate.^^ According to one Interpretation, possible 
entities in Scotus do not depend on the divine intellect for their being possible 
but only for being something (i.e., for their eidetic content)."*^ 
(c) Like many before h i m , Blumenberg finally blames the OA for deriving 
the real existence o f a th ing from its concept alone. Anselm has boldly ventured 
"to derive existence immediately from the concept, and only from this single 
one."49 This is a rather usefui, albeit inaccurate description o f Anseim's proce-
dure. It is usefui, because Anselm is in fact t ry ing to demonstrate that the pro-
position "God (necessariiy) exists" is analytically true. I t is inaccurate, because 
Anseim's OA takes the form of a reductio argument in which the conclusion is 
not immediately derived from the premises, but through showing that its nega-
t ion implies a contradiction.The ontological proof cannot do v/ithout premises 
such as the assumption that in the case of God, real (and necessary) existence is 
a perfection - even if, unlike in a syllogism for instance, the premises are not 
formal ones in this case. Anseim's project was " to have the concept achieve what 
Otherwise only perception in its contingency could yield,"5° to warrant the real 
45 Biumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen, 4 0 1 , n. 16. 
46 C f Tobias Hoffmann, "Duns Scorus on the Or ig in o f the Possibles in rhe Divine 
Intellect," in Philosophical Debates at l^aris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen 
R Brown, Thomas Dewender and Theo Kobusch (Leiden: Br i l l , 2 0 0 9 ) , 3 5 9 - 3 7 9 . 
47 See Stanislav Sousedik,"Der Streit um den wahren Sinn der scodschen Possibilien-
lehre," m John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludger Honnefeider, Rcga 
Wood and Mechthi ld Dreyer (Leiden: Br i l l , 1996) , i 9 i - ' 2 0 4 . 
48 See Hoffmann, "Duns Scotus on the Origin of the Possibles in the Divine Intellect." 
49 C f Biumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 298 . 
50 Ibid. 
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existence o f the th ing conceived o f But this is nothing but an idie dream.^' One 
cannot "go beyond the concept''^ -^^ ; that much, Biumenberg takes for granted. 
Amongst the curretu objections against the OA, this last one Stands apart; 
for it neither attempts to demonstrate the falsiry o f one of its premises, nor does 
it challenge its soundness."Real existence never foilows from the concept alone," 
then, is a principle that can only serve as an epitaph to the OA - for the simple 
reason that i t already presupposes its demise. I f it is to be more than a worthless 
promise, at least one latal flaw of the OA must be laid open. For its defenders like 
Anselm, precisely, claim to have found an a priori proof to the effect that in the 
one exceptional case of the most perfect being, an analysis o f the concept alone 
is sufficient to prove that i t really exists. A populär and yet completely irrational 
line of argument has it that one may well accept the argument as is, whi le niain-
taining that i t is an open question whether its conclusion is true. True, we can-
not but th ink that God really exists, so the argument goes; yet all this shows is 
just that we cannot but th ink otherwise, not that God really exists.^^ But to put 
it like this is to accept a blatant contradiction:^^ j t would then be at once true 
and false that we cannot but th ink that God really exists. Likewise, Kant's assur-
ance that the proposition "God is not [sc. real]" cannot imply a contradiction, 
because its subject is"suspended"-55 that i t is predicated as non-existent in real-
ity - w i l l not do. For the OA purports to show, precisely, that i t is contradictory 
to predicate a most perfect being as non-existent in reality^^ 
2. Blumenberg's Critique cf Anseim's Tijeologicai Anthropoiogy 
2.1 Hans Blumenberg's Anselm: Humanity as Ersatz, 
In two late works. Augustine claims that "elect" human individuals who come 
to enjoy the Community w i th God in the heavenly city serve, as i t were, a higher 
purpose: they restore the perfect number o f rational creatures in the city o f God, 
51 Ibid.: "Ist dieses Muster den Tniurnen der Philosophie von ihren Gipfelersteigungen 
inhärent geblieben." 
52 Blumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen., 826. 
55 See, for example, John L. Mackic, The Miracle ofTheism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), 53. 
54 Cf Friedrich Flerraanni, "Der ontologische Gottesbeweis," Neue Zeitschrift für Sys-
tematische Theologie und Religionsphdosophie 4 4 ( 2 0 0 2 ) : 250: "Wenn Gott nur als 
existierend gedacht werden kann, dann kann nicht /.ugleich gedacht werden, dass er 
möglicherweise nicht existiert." 
55 Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 5 9 4 f 
56 See also Goebel,"Nachdenken über den ontologischen Gottesbeweis," 120-125. 
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following its d im inu t ion through the fall o f one part o f the angeis (the only 
other rational creatures besides us humans). Since angels do not procreate and 
thereby add to their number, and were all created simultaneously, Augustine 
believes that fallen humans (who for h im doubdessly exist) w i l l not be replaced 
by the members o f any other species; and that these individual human beings, 
since God does not,after their death, restore them to their original State, cannot 
have been part o f the elect r ight from the outset o f their existence. 
Now, is this to say that such a compensatory capacity is the only reason why 
God created humanity.' Or would God have made the human race even wi thout 
the occurrence of the fall o f Satan and his cohorts? A reader o f Augustine does 
not get an answer to this rather serious query. For Augusdne deliberately leaves 
the question open, stating that apart from the human beings who replace the 
fallen angels, others, "perhaps" (fortassis; fortasse) count among the elect.57 
Anselm ponders this problem in his Cur Deus homo in a rather longish digres-
sion.^^ According to Blumenberg, i t contains the very essence of his theological 
anthropology. The "divine interesr" in humanity, says Blumenberg, consists for 
Anselm in 
resetting, after the fall of the devil, the number o f angels in the heavenly 
choir corresponding to the divine plan, to its Status quo ante through pro-
modng just members of the human race to their [sc. the fallen angels'] for-
mer ranks.59 
And Blumenberg takes Anselm to be saying that this is the one and only 
motive why God has created humanity, "that the human race only entered the 
scene as an ersatz for the devil,"^'' "that man was made for no other reason than to 
f i l l the vacancies in the heavenly choir,"^'and that the whole history of the 
human k ind "should be nothing eise than the inadequate attempt to restore the 
past splendour o f the divine household."^^ He finds i t "almost unbelievable"^^ 
57 C f Augustine, De civitate dei, ed. Bernard Dombart and Alfons Kalb, CCSL 4 7 - 4 8 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1955) , i z . i ; and Enchiridion adLaurentium deßde, spe etcaritate, 
ed. Ernest Evans, CCSL 46 (Turnhout: Brepols, i<)6i-));t'). 
58 The two interlocutors in Cur Deus homo Icave litt le doubt that this topic is treated 
by way of digression and that its discussion is dispensable for the main argument of 
the dialoguc; c f Anselm, C«/r D m " homo 1.16. 
59 B1 u mcn berg, Arbeit am Mythos, 276 . 
60 Ibid., 278 (my italics). 
61 IMumenher^fMatihäuspassion, 119 (my italics). 
61 Biumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, 276 (my italics). 
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and calls it a"monstrosity"^'4 that Anselm should say such a th ing in a book deal-
ing w i th the incarnation o f God, a doctrine that most strongly suggests that 
humanity is the "Wekzweck,'"'^ Blumenberg goes on to criricize Anselm for not 
taking seriously our individuality when developing his, as we might säyfersatz 
anthropology"; he thinks that this failure is due to Anseim's acceptance o f a the-
ory of individuation that regards the individual as nothing eise than a"hyletically 
induced copy"*" '^ o f the essence. 
2.2 The Historical Anselm: Humanity as an End in Itself 
Such are the disciosures of Hans Blumenberg's Anselm. Is this also what the real 
Anselm holds? The answer is straightforward - i t is not. The ''ersatz anthropol-
ogy" o f Blumenberg's Anselm has almost noth ing in common w i th that o f the 
historical Anselm. What is more, these differences do not only concern the quest 
for a raison d'etre o f humanity, but also the theory o f individuation: Hans Blu-
menberg's Anselm and the real Anselm not only disagree w i t h each other as to 
their theological anthropology, but also w i th regard to their metaphysics. For 
Anselm never suggests that some metaphysical matter is the principle o f indi-
viduation. Ontologically speaking, an individual is constituted for h im by its 
"universal substance" {substantia uniuersalis) - nameiy the species to which i t 
belongs - and a specific "collection o£ properties" (proprietatum coilectio), a the-
ory that can be traced back at least 10 Porphyry and that Anselm could find in 
Boethius.^’7 Apart from that, it is certainly odd when Blumenberg says that in 
Anseim's supposed ''ersatz anthropology" the individual comes down to next to 
nothing while the nature is almost everything. Quite rhe contrary: i f Blumenberg 
were right, then human nature had only been created so that human individu-
als substitute for the individuals o f another nature to whose individual moral 
faults humanity owes its very existence. 
As to the question for what reason humanity has been created, Anselm 
unambiguously denies the posidon that Blumenberg attributes to h im: 
64 Ibid., 276. 
65 Ibid., 278. 
66 Ibid. 
67 See Christophe Erismann; "Proprietatum coilectio: Anselme de Canterbury 
et le Probleme de l ' individuation," Mediaevalia: Textos e estudos 11 (2003): 55-
71; and Goebel, "Anseim's Theory of Universals Reconsidered," Insights 2 (2009): 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ias/instghts/Goebel6May2.pdf 
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It is necessary either that human nature was created for the compledon o f 
that perfection [sc. o f creation], or that it is superfluous to i t - something 
which we dare not say o f the nature of the smailest worm. Consequently, the 
human race was created there for its own sake [pro se ipsa), and not just for 
the restoration of individuals o f another nature. From this i t is piain that, 
even i f no angel had perished, humans would none the less have had their 
place i n the heavenly city.'^^ 
Anselm is thereby taking sides in what to all appearances was a major the-
ological dispute in his lifetime.The parties involved in this dispute seem to have 
shared the fol lowing presuppositions: ( i ) that there is a perfect number o f rational 
beings elected to the beatific vision o f God; (2) that the creator in his wisdom 
had decreed this number before rhe first rational creatures feil from F4im; (5) 
that we cannot possibly know the perfect number in this life; and (4) that those 
angels who excluded themselves from the Community w i th God are replaced by 
human beings - which means that the number o f humans amongst the elect 
must be at least as large as that o f the lost angels. For Boso, Anseim's interlocu-
tor in the Cur Dens homo, (4) is a tenet o f the Christian faith {hoc credimus)f^ 
Sdll, Boso desires a radonal argument for i t , and Anselm provides h i m wi th one. 
In doing so, Anselm like Augustine takes i t that there is no th i rd species of 
rational beings that might make up for the fallen angels. 
The debate focussed on the problem whether the number o f human beings 
in the countable set o f the elect is superior to the number o f lost angels, or 
whether their numbers are equal.7° I f the elect human beings outnumber the 
lost angels, then humanity cannot have been created only in order that the lost 
angels be replaced. If, on the other hand, the number of human beings amongst 
the elect were equal to that o f the lost angels - i t cannot be smaller due to pre-
supposition (4) - i t would foUow that humanity has been created exclusively in 
view of their replacement.The angels would have consdtuted the perfect number 
by themselves. N o human individual would have been part o f i t r ight from the 
outset. But this, observes Anselm, is an awkward admission. For i f we suppose 
that the perfect number is equal to the number o f the angels and that all rational 
creatures were made simultaneously, i t wou ld then fol low that either some 
angels or some human beings have sinned out o f necessity, since i t would only 
68 Anselm, Cur Deus homo i . 18. 
69 Ibid., i.i6. 
70 C f rhe hcading Cur Deus homo 1.18: " U m i m plures futuri sint sancri homines 
quam sinr mali angeli." Anselm simpiy seems to presuppose char there cannot be 
rwo cqually perfect numbers of the elect, and that the number o f the elect is finite. 
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be througl i their sin that the perfect number is reached.7’ Yet the idea that a 
rational being sins out of necessity is according to Anselm irreconcilable w i th 
God's goodness; i t is also incompatible w i th God's punishing that rational 
being. What is more, the elect human beings would then have reason to rejoice 
over the fall of the angels; this would be at odds not only w i t h the goodness o f 
their creator, but also wi th their own justice. Anselm thus comes to favour the 
view that the number o f elect human beings is indeed greater than the number 
of lost angels - which is to say that humanity is no mere ersatz. We encounter 
the same sentiment i n Gi lbert Crispin (L045/46--1117) and in the school o f 
Anselm of Laon (ca. 1050-111:7), whi le Ralph o f Battie (1040-1124), amongst 
others, seems to side w i th Hans Blumenberg's Anseim.^^ 
Gregory the Great interpreted D t 32:8b ("Statuit terminos gent ium secun-
dum numerum angelorum Dei") as revealing that angels and human beings 
form two equipotent subsets w i t h i n the entire set o f the elect.73 After a thor-
ough exegesis, comparing different Latin renditions of this verse, Anselm con-
curs w i th Gregory.'''* However, he hastens to explain that this is a far cry f rom 
saying that as many angels have fallen as have remained steadfast.75 The reason 
for this clarification is the fol lowing: I f i t were true that as many angels have 
fallen as have remained steadfast, and i f i t were further true that angels and 
human beings form two equipotent subsets w i t h i n the set o f all the elect, i t 
would fol low that the number o f elect human beings is not greater than, but 
equivalent to, the number offallen angels. For in that case rhe number of elect 
angels (NEA) wou ld be identical to the number o f lost angels (NLA) , and like-
wise be idendcal to the number o f elect human beings (NEH) ; and the num-
ber o f elect human beings would, consequendy, be equivalent to the number 
of lost angels: 
71 C f Anselm, Cur Deus homo i . 18. 
72 C f Gilbert Crispin, De angelo perdito 63, in The Works of Gdbert Crispin, Abbot ofWest-
minster, ed. Anna Sapir Abulafia and Gil i ian R. Evans (London: Oxford University 
Press, 11>86), 112; and Anselm of Laon {School), Antequam quicquam fieret, Deus erat 
4 (De creatione homims), in Psychologie et morale aux Xlle et XlUe Steeles, vol. 5: Problemes 
d'histoire Idteraire: L'ecole dAnselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Charnpeaux, ed. Odon 
Lortin (Gembloux: j . Duculot, 1959), 335; and Ralph o f Battie, Meditatio cmusdam 
chrtstiani de fide et quia quae secundum fidem credimus etiarn secundum rationem 
intelligimus, Oxford ßodleian MS Laud Misc. 363, 38v-39r: "De his autem duabus 
opinionibus.. . ista quae dicit quia nisi angelus peccasset homo non fieret libentius 
audio et plus se concordat cum meo animo." 
73 Gregory the Great, Homilia in Evangelia, ed. Raymond Etaix, CCSL 141 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1999), 34.11. 
74 Anselm, Cur Deus homo 1.18. 
75 Ibid. 
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NEA = NLA 
NEA = N E H 
NEH = NLA. 
Under such premises, dien, the human kind would after all turn out to be a mere 
substitute, just as holds Hans Blumenberg's Anselm. But this is precisely not the 
role of humanity in the eyes of the historical Anselm. We do not need to rehearse 
the historical Ansehn's entire reasoning in support o f his view that there are to 
be more elect humans than fallen angels: Desmond Paul Henry did that thor-
oughly over forty years ago.7^ The anthropology of Hans Blumenberg's Anselm 
is merely a straw man. 
2.3 Rational Theology 
Blumenberg has further suggested that Anseim's Cur Deus homo is an example 
o f mythical rather than of rational theology.^7 Let me finally indicate two fea-
tures of its method that in my eyes strongly point i n the opposite direction. 
First, Anseim's reasoning hinges on a fundamental principle upon which 
Anselm and Boso have explicitly agreed at the outset o f their colloquy: nameiy, 
that not even the süghtest "imipropriety" [inconvenientia) be allowed in theol-
ogy By that they mean that anything inconsistent and hence unreasonable ought 
to be banned from, i t . This is why any theory concerning the preservation of the 
perfect number is unacceptable to both interlocutors unless i t is i n keeping w i th 
the divine attributes of " that a greater than which cannot be thought," most 
importantly wi th its perfect goodness. I f such a theory comes to saying that some 
angels or human beings have sinned by necessity, or i f i t implies that one part 
of the elect knowingly profits from the fall o f those who are lost and therefore 
has reason to rejoice over their misfortune, i t w i l l have to be discarded. Provided 
that there is a more innocuous alternative, i t would run counter to God's per-
j6 See Desmond P. Henry, V)e Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 
Z2Z--229 ("Numerically Definite Reasoning"). 
77 C f Blumenberg, Matthäuspassion, 119: "Der Crundmythos des Anselm von Canter-
bury, ... dass der Mensch nur geschaffen worden sei, um die durch Lngelverderbnis 
vakanten Sitze im Himmelschor wieder aufzufüllen" and Arbeit am Mythos, 274 -
281, at 280: "Anselm löst endgültig den gnosdschen Grundmythos vom Freikauf der 
Menschen aus dem Gewahrsam des Weltherrschers ab durch den neuen von der 
unendlichen Genugtuung des Sohns gegenüber dem Vater." 
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fect goodness to allow for this sort o f pervena gratulatio7^ Cur Dem homo is an 
exercise in rational theology. Thus, when Anselm tries to settle the quesdon what 
human nature was made for, he refers to his method as "prov ing by reason" 
(rationeprobare) in the ambit o f a problem left open by Christian authorities.79 
Secondly, the dispute over the anthropological impÜcations o f Augustine's 
eschatology was at once a dispute about how to Interpret the biblical narrative 
of creadon. Are we to understand the Statement that God created the " l igh t " on 
"the first day" and everything eise on the subsequent"days o f creadon" as mean-
ing that God first created the angeis and in doing so created t ime, and at a later 
moment in time created the material wor ld inciuding human beings (even i f 
"day" can hardly be taken to refer to a solar day before the sun was made)? Or 
should we rather Interpret all indications o f dme - and everything eise imply-
ing the idea of a process - allegoricaliy, to the effect that everything was really cre-
ated simultaneously? Augustine seems to prefer the second reading.^° And so 
does Anselm; although he is speaking in the condit ional, he obviously favours 
the idea that "these days in which Moses appears to say this universe was cre-
ated, not all o f it simultaneously, are to be understood otherwise than how we 
see those days in which we live."*^' 
This is just oiie example in this dialogue bearing witness o f a general 
endeavour to arrive at a radonal interpretadon o f Holy Scripture - an interpre-
tation compatible not w i th mythical thought but w i t h the findings o f a rational 
theology. 
Anselm contrasts his exegesis o f Genesis i w i t h the opin ion of"certain peo-
pie" (quidam) who gather from it that human nature was created only "after the 
fall o f the bad angels."^^ But even i f they were right, he observes, this would not 
necessariiy mean that humanity was only created as some k ind o f substitutes 
bench for an ini t ia l team of angels, as Hans Blumenberg's Anselm has i t . I t only 
would i f the perfect number wcie. originally made up o f angels alone. But accord-
ing to Anselm there is strong reason to suppose that the angels feil short o f this 
numben^5 Por the most part, Blumenberg's strictures against Anseim's anthro-
pology do not concern Anseim's anthropoiogy at all - neither w i t h regard to its 
method nor to its chief contents. 
78 See Anselm, Cur Deus homo i.iH. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See Augustine, De Cenesi ad liiteram Uber imperfectus, ed. Joseph Zycha, CSEL z8, i 
{Vienna: E lempsky, 1894), 9.31; and De civitate dei 11.9. 
81 Anselm, Cur Deus homo i . 18. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
